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Courts presented with objections to jury composition can examine
such claims either under the sixth amendment's fair cross-section
analysis or under the equal protection analysis of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.1 Defendants usually will find it far easier to
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1. The sixth amendment provides that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
State defendants can bring equal protection claims under the express language of the
fourteenth amendment, which states that "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Federal defendants
can bring equal protection claims under the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500 n.3
(1975); Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Actions found invalid under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause also are invalid under the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 364-65 n.4 (1974).
Federal defendants can also bring jury composition claims under the statutory
equivalent of the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement, embodied in the Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1962), which states: "It is the
policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by juryshall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section
of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes . . . ." This
policy is implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1862, which states: "No citizen shall be excluded
from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the
Court of International Trade on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
economic status."
The sixth amendment guarantee and this statutory requirement "have been construed
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meet the requirements of sixth amendment analysis. This Article
considers which type of analysis is appropriate when a defendant al-
leges that particular groups have been excluded from his jury.
Courts have confused .the two analyses both in cases involving the
jury venire and, more frequently, in cases involving the petit jury.2
Especially when examining claims that a prosecutor has used pe-
remptory challenges to exclude a group from the petit jury, courts
have limited unnecessarily the jury composition claims by looking to
certain equal protection requirements even when applying a sixth
amendment analysis.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the continu-
ing validity of applying the sixth amendment's fair cross-section re-
quirement to prevent the exclusion of certain groups from the jury
venire.3 However, in another recent case, Batson v. Kentucky,4 the
Court declined an opportunity to decide whether the fair cross-sec-
tion requirement, like the requirements of equal protection, can be
applied not only at the jury venire level but also at the petit jury
level to prevent the use of peremptory challenges to exclude certain
groups from the jury. Since 1978, six states and two circuits have
agreed to use the sixth amendment to limit the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude groups such as blacks.5
In Batson, the Supreme Court greatly eased the onerous burden of
proof requirement for equal protection challenges to the petit jury.6
Nevertheless, the Court failed to grapple with the many cases that
still can be brought only under a sixth amendment analysis, not an
equal protection analysis, regardless of the equal protection burden
of proof requirement. The first step necessary to a full consideration
of a challenge to the selection of a petit jury is acknowledging that
the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement applies to the
as functional equivalents." United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 22 n.I (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984). Although the Act is not binding on the states, states may
consider the Act in considering the methods used by the state to select grand juries. See
State v. Rochester, 54 N.J. 85, 253 A.2d 474 (1969).
2. The jury selection process begins with the selection from the public of a pool
of qualified persons. A number of the people in the jury pool are chosen randomly to
constitute the jury venire for a particular trial. After a group of potential jurors is ob-
tained from a jury list and after excuses have been given, a voir dire is held in which
either the judge or the attorneys question the potential jurors. Some are excused "for
cause," that is, for specific reasons set out by statute. But an attorney can use peremp-
tory challenges to eliminate some jurors without giving any reason for doing so, Every
state, as well as the federal government, permits the use of peremptory challenges. The
number of such challenges allowed, however, may vary with the seriousness of the crime,
and may be different for the defense and prosecution. On the entire jury selection pro-
cess, see generally J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES (1977).
3. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
4. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
5. See infra notes 56-62.
6. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. at 1722-23.
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petit jury as well as to the jury venire. Second, and equally impor-
tant, courts then must apply the sixth amendment analysis without
importing burdensome and inappropriate requirements from equal
protection analysis. The two chief limitations on equal protection
claims that have been applied improperly to fair cross-section claims
are those related to standing and to the definition of what constitutes
a group whose exclusion cannot be permitted.
This Article argues that only the sixth amendment's fair cross-
section analysis, and not equal protection analysis, can fully protect
a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury.
Part I presents the caselaw and the basic analytic approach under-
taken by courts in considering equal protection challenges and fair
cross-section challenges to the composition of the grand jury, the
jury venire, or the petit jury. Part II discusses the serious standing
problems a defendant faces in challenging jury composition under
equal protection analysis. An equal protection claim, unlike a fair
cross-section claim, requires a defendant to be a member of the ex-
cluded group in order to bring suit. Part III explores the different
definitions, under equal protection analysis and fair cross-section
analysis, of groups that cannot be excluded from jury service. Al-
though no consensus definition of cognizability exists, it is clear that
more groups are recognized as cognizable for sixth amendment pur-
poses than are considered suspect classes for equal protection pur-
poses. Finally, Part IV describes the different purposes served by the
applications of fair cross-section analysis and equal protection analy-
sis. This review will support the Article's thesis that the purposes of
the fair cross-section requirement are not served if its application is
limited by equal protection concepts of standing and group
cognizability.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet applied the fair cross-
section requirement to limit the use of peremptory challenges, apply-
ing the requirement to the petit jury is only logical since it definitely
applies at the venire level. A defendant is tried by the petit jury, not
the venire. The sixth amendment right to a fair and impartial jury is
meaningless if it is upheld at the venire level but not at the petit jury
level. But even if the Supreme Court ultimately were to decide not to
apply the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement to limit
the use of peremptory challenges, it is important to recognize the
differences in application and results of fair cross-section analysis
and equal protection analysis. This must be done if we at least are to
continue to uphold a defendant's sixth amendment rights at the
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grand jury and jury venire levels. Although lower federal courts and
state courts have been most likely to limit fair cross-section claims
with equal protection requirements on standing and group
cognizability in cases involving objections to the petit jury, the same
tendency has been evidenced in some cases involving the jury venire.7
Furthermore, because the states are entitled to give defendants
greater protection than is granted under federal law,8 this Article
should prove helpful to those state courts that have decided, regard-
less of the federal view, to shift from equal protection analysis to fair
cross-section analysis in jury composition cases at the level of the
petit jury.
I. BACKGROUND
Supreme Court Caselaw on Jury Composition
The two key jury selection procedures that often are challenged
are (1) the way in which the large jury panel or venire is composed,
and (2) the way in which particular venirepersons then are excluded
by means of peremptory challenges from service on the petit jury.
During the voir dire, an attorney can use both "for cause" challenges
and peremptory challenges to strike some venirepersons from the
petit jury. Peremptory challenges, unlike "for cause" challenges, do
not require the attorney to give any reason for eliminating a poten-
tial juror.9 Courts face an increasing number of claims that peremp-
tory challenges are being used to exclude improperly from the petit
jury all jurors in a particular group.
The Supreme Court has ruled explicitly that the composition of
the jury venire is subject to challenge under both equal protection
analysis and sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis."0 The petit
jury, as affected by the peremptory challenge system, has not been
subject to the same scrutiny as the jury venire. This is because the
Court has not ruled whether the fair cross-section requirement ap-
plies to limit the use of peremptory challenges. In 1965, however, in
7. See, e.g., Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1986); Pope v. State, 256
Ga. 189, 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986).
8. See Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 959 (1985); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707 (1983). See also State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511
A.2d 1150 (1986).
9. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), the Court characterized the
peremptory challenge as "one of the most important of the rights" in our justice system.
The Constitution, however, does not grant a right to peremptory challenges. See Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.l
(1948); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). Justice Marshall has urged
that peremptory challenges, for both the defendant and the prosecution, be eliminated
entirely. See Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) (Marshall J., concurring).
10. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975).
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Swain v. Alabama," the Court found that equal protection princi-
ples could limit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The
Court required an extremely high burden of proof before the use of
peremptory challenges would be found in violation of equal
protection.
For more than twenty years, the Supreme Court said that an
equal protection claim regarding the petit jury would be successful
only if it could be shown that peremptory challenges had been used
in trial after trial to exclude blacks, or persons in some other pro-
tected group, from service as jurors.'2 This special aspect of the
equal protection burden of proof, the systematic exclusion require-
ment, was subject to widespread criticism.'3 Equal protection objec-
tions to peremptory challenges almost never succeeded 14 because de-
fendants faced the nearly insurmountable practical problem of
locating supporting data necessary to show a pattern of discrimina-
tion.' 5 Recently, in Batson,'6 the Supreme Court acknowledged that
Swain's systematic exclusion requirement, as interpreted by the
lower courts, had "placed on defendants a crippling burden of
i1. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain had objected because the prosecutor used pe-
remptory challenges to strike all six eligible blacks on the venire. Swain, who was black,
was found guilty of rape by an all-white jury. Because the sixth amendment was not
made applicable to the states until 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
Swain had to make his claim based on the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal
protection.
12. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 222-28.
13. Most critics of Swain emphasized the argument, made by Justice Goldberg in
his dissent, that the majority had placed excessive importance on peremptory challenges
by treating them as if they were a fundamental right. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 244
(Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg pointed out that peremptory challenges are
not required by the Constitution; they are merely a procedural device originating in stat-
utes or judge made law. In fact, prosecutors functioned without peremptory challenges
until 1887 when the Supreme Court recognized the prosecutor's right to exercise them.
See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
14. See United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984) ("Although caselaw repeatedly describes the defendant's
burden of proof as 'not insurmountable' (cites omitted) . . . a defendant has successfully
established systematic exclusion in only two cases since Swain was decided in 1965. State
v. Brown, 371 So.2d 751 (La. 1979) and State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La.
1979) (same statistical evidence).").
15. To make a claim under Swain, a defendant needed to present statistical evi-
dence. Because the state controls the selection process, defendants had difficulty collect-
ing the data, if it was available at all. See Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitu-
tional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157, 1161
(1966) ("[tlhe problem of evidentiary logistics is rendered virtually insoluble by the pres-
sure of time, the lack of extant records and the general unavailability to the defendant of
those which do exist.").
16. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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proof' ' 7 that left peremptory challenges "largely immune from con-
stitutional scrutiny."18 The Court expressly rejected the evidentiary
burden that Swain had placed on defendants and held that "a de-
fendant may make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in
selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its
selection in his case."' 9
The sixth amendment's fair cross-section basis for challenging jury
composition, which the Supreme Court has not yet applied to the use
of peremptory challenges, first was applied explicitly to the jury ve-
nire in 1975 in Taylor v. Louisiana.20 Although for decades the Su-
preme Court had discussed in general terms the need for a jury to
reflect the community fairly,2" in Taylor the Court specifically ar-
ticulated the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement and
applied it to the states.2" Taylor, a male defendant, challenged a
state statute that permitted women to serve jury duty only if they
requested to do so and, thereby, effectively eliminated women from
juries. The Court "squarely held that the exclusion of women from
jury venires deprives a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment
right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community." 23 The Court found that since the "two sexes are
not fungible," 24 a distinct quality is lost from the jury if either sex is
excluded. 25 Thus, the defendant's right to a fair cross-section of the
community on his jury is violated. Because the cross-section require-
ment is an "essential component"2 6 of the constitutional right to an
impartial jury, "identifiable segments playing major roles in the
community" 27 cannot be excluded from the jury. The Court did not
specify which groups in society it was considering because
17. Id. at 1720.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1722 (emphasis original).
20. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) ("As we said in
Williams, a jury will come to such a judgment as long as it consists of a group of laymen
representative of a cross-section of the community .. "); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 100 (1970) (the Court found that the number of persons on a jury should be large
enough "to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community."); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ("But they must not allow
the desire for competent jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with
the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the community."); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instru-
ments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.").
22. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). In Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149, an
earlier case, the Supreme Court found that, through the fourteenth amendment, the sixth
amendment applies to the states.
23. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 535-36.
24. Id. at 531.
25. See id. at 532.
26. Id. at 528.
27. Id. at 530.
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"[c]ommunities differ at different times and places [and what] is a
fair cross-section at one time and place is not necessarily a fair cross-
section at another time or a different place." 8
The Supreme Court previously had stated that maintaining the
"broad representative character of the jury"2 9 assures "diffused im-
partiality. ' 30 The fair cross-section requirement is violated if any
substantial group in the community, known as a cognizable or dis-
tinctive group, is excluded from the jury, whether or not the exclu-
sion was intentional.
The Taylor Court placed careful limits on the scope of its holding,
stating that while a jury "must be drawn from a source fairly repre-
sentative of the community," 31 the actual jury chosen - the petit
jury - need not "mirror the community."' 2 The process for select-
ing juries must be one by which representative juries can be chosen
but the actual jury chosen need not represent statistically all groups
in the community. The fair cross-section requirement maximizes the
chance of obtaining a representative jury.
The actual jury selected, the petit jury, need not include with sta-
tistical accuracy every cognizable group. The fair cross-section re-
quirement is satisfied if the state follows jury selection methods that
give the defendant the opportunity to have a jury drawn from mem-
bers of all cognizable groups. For example, so long as the selection
methods promote this goal, the requirement is met even if the petit
jury is composed entirely of blacks, whites, men, women, or senior
citizens. It is the steps leading up to the selection of the petit jury,
not any particular petit jury selected, that are examined to deter-
mine if the fair cross-section requirement has been violated.3
To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section re-
quirement at the venire level, the Court has required a defendant to
show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the com-
munity; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which ju-
ries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to
28. Id. at 537.
29. Id. at 530 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
30. Id. at 530.
31. Id. at 538.
32. Id. This is a realistic limit given the large number of potential groups, the
very limited size of the jury, and the consequences of permitting challenges for cause.
See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 17-18.
33. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528.
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systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
4
In order to show an equal protection violation based on the exclusion
of a group from the jury, the Supreme Court has required, in the
context of a race-based claim, that 1) the defendant "establish that
the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment under the law, as written or as applied," 2) the
degree of underrepresentation be proved "by comparing the propor-
tion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to
serve . ..over a significant period of time, and 3) "a selection pro-
cedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports
the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical
showing."35
The difference between the equal protection analysis and fair
cross-section analysis which is discussed most often is the burden of
proof requirement. 36 Under an equal protection analysis, the defend-
ant must show purposeful discrimination. 37 If he proves a prima fa-
cie case, the government may rebut the case merely by showing that
neutral criteria or procedures were used.38 In contrast, under fair
cross-section analysis, the defendant need not show any discrimina-
tory intent.39 The government can rebut a prima facie case only by
showing "that a significant state interest [is] manifestly and primar-
ily advanced by those aspects of the jury selection process . . . that
result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group."' 40 If,
for example, a state's method of compiling lists of potential jurors
results in the selection of few women or blacks as potential jurors,
the state cannot overcome a fair cross-section claim by showing that
it chose its compilation method to save time or money and not to
exclude blacks or women from the jury.
The fair cross-section analysis is somewhat different when used to
limit peremptory challenges at the petit jury level. At the petit jury
level, a defendant must show that a substantial likelihood exists that
the challenges leading to the exclusion of a group were made on the
basis of group affiliation rather than because of an individual's possi-
34. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 364, 368 (1979).
35. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
36. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 684 n.7 (11th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Duran De Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. 1326, 1327 n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
37. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26.
38. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495; see also United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d
541, 552 n.17 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1267, remanded, 813 F.2d 658 (5th
Cir. 1987); Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1546 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983).
39. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26; see also Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp.
942, 949 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
40. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68; see also Leslie, 783 F.2d at 552 n.17; Gibson, 705
F.2d at 1546 n.4; United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380, 1384 n.5 (1 th Cir.
1982).
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ble inability to fairly decide the case.4' There is no fair cross-section
violation if peremptory challenges are used to exclude jurors with
specific bias in a particular case with the result that certain groups
are not represented on the jury. A defendant is not entitled to a jury
that actually represents the community, only to the opportunity to
have such a jury selected.42
Although the Supreme Court consistently has applied the six
amendment's fair cross-section requirement to the jury venire,43 it
has not decided explicitly whether the fair cross-section requirement
applies to the petit jury. In 1978 the Court indicated that the fair
cross-section requirement applies to the petit jury when it held that a
five-person petit jury was unconstitutional because it was too small
to represent the community accurately.44 Nevertheless, the Court re-
cently declined to decide whether the fair cross-section requirement
applies to the petit jury in the context of groups excluded through
the use of peremptory challenges.4 5 But even after the Supreme
Court declined the opportunity to decide the issue, the Second and
Sixth Circuits reaffirmed their findings that the fair cross-section re-
quirement applies to the petit jury.46
There would seem to be no point in establishing elaborate means
of ensuring that members of various groups are included on venires
if peremptory challenges can be used to exclude all of these same
people from the petit jury.41 As one court has noted:
No defendant has ever been tried before a venire; the venire is not the body
that deliberates in the jury room: no defendant has even been found guilty
by a venire. If there is a Sixth Amendment requirement that the venire
41. See, e.g., Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 225 (2d Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 224-25.
43. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); see also Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
44. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (plurality opinion of Black-
mun, J.).
45. See Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1764-65 in which the Court stated that "an ex-
tension of the fair cross section requirement to petit juries would be unworkable and
unsound .... " Id. at 1765. But the Court did not actually decide the question because
it went on to say that even if it "were willing to extend the fair cross section requirement
to petit juries" there would be no violation of the requirement in this case. Id. The Court
came to this conclusion by holding that the group excluded - persons who were opposed
to the death penalty - did not constitute a cognizable group whose exclusion triggered
sixth amendment review. The Lockhart Court also noted that in another case that term,
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Court had declined to consider the sixth
amendment claim and had expressed no view on its merits. See id. at 1764-65.
46. See Roman, 822 F.2d at 227; Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 910 (1987).
47. See McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari).
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represent a fair cross-section of the community, it must logically be because
it is important that the defendant have the chance that the petit jury will be
similarly constituted.
4 8
Nevertheless, many courts have refused to use sixth amendment fair
cross-section analysis to limit peremptory challenges. These courts
have contended that peremptory challenges may be examined only
under equal protection analysis. 49 The Supreme Court's reliance on
equal protection analysis rather than fair cross-section analysis has
dissuaded lower courts from turning to a fair cross-section analysis.
But, as will be shown below, equal protection analysis presents insur-
mountable obstacles for many defendants seeking to object to the
composition of their juries.
The Problem: When Defendants Cannot Rely On Equal Protection
Analysis
A defendant faces far greater problems if he wishes to object to
the composition of the petit jury than if he wishes to object to the
composition of the jury venire. If a defendant objects to the jury
venire, he may do so under either equal protection analysis or the
sixth amendment's fair cross-section analysis. However, if he wishes
to object to the composition of the petit jury - the jury that actu-
ally tries him - many courts presently permit him to do so only
under equal protection analysis.
Equal protection analysis and sixth amendment fair cross-section
analysis in jury composition cases differ in three important ways.
First, the defendant's burden of proof is substantially less in a fair
cross-section challenge. In an equal protection claim, a defendant
must show intentional discrimination and, until recently, had to do
so by looking not only to the jury in his own case, but to many other
trials to show a pattern of systematic exclusion. Conversely, a de-
48. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986)
and Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). On remand, the parties stipulated that
the state would withdraw its appeal. The Second Circuit's original opinion, however, was
not withdrawn. See Roman, 822 F.2d at 227; see also McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. at
969 (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari, stated that "[t]here is no point
in taking elaborate steps to ensure that Negroes are included on venires simply so they
can then be struck because of their race by a prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges.")
49. See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107
S. Ct. 1267, remanded, 813 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1987); Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d
1091 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1984); Willis v.
Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1219 n.14 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 (1984);
United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1063 (1984); United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983); Weathersby
v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1046 (1984); United
States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983); United States
v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1983).
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fendant may prevail on a fair cross-section claim without proving
discriminatory intent.
Second, different standards exist for determining whether a
group's exclusion indicates a possible constitutional violation. Ac-
tions directed at suspect classes such as blacks, groups limited in
number and generally defined by reference to past ill treatment, trig-
ger heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. Groups cog-
nizable for sixth amendment purposes are the many groups in the
community whose members are sufficiently distinct and numerous
that they must be considered for jury service if juries are to re-
present a fair cross-section of the community. There are groups such
as the poor, which probably are cognizable for fair cross-section pur-
poses, but which are not suspect classes.50
Third, different standing requirements accompany each constitu-
tional challenge. A defendant need not be a member of the excluded
group in order to bring a fair cross-section claim. A "same class"
rule requiring that a defendant be a member of the excluded class is
applied for equal protection claims, although a few courts have taken
the contrary view.51
For many defendants, equal protection analysis will be of little use
because of its strict standing requirements and limited definition of
which groups cannot be excluded from the jury. These defendants
are unable to bring jury composition challenges based on equal pro-
tection principles because of the standing requirement that the de-
fendant be a member of the excluded group, and because there are
only a few groups whose exclusion triggers heightened scrutiny.52 If
50. See infra note 163.
51. Compare United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984) (same class rule) and United States v. Musto, 540 F.
Supp. 346, 353 (D.N.J. 1982), affd sub nom., United States v. Amimone 715 F.2d 822(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984) with Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d at
1386 (no same class rule), State v. Maricopa County, slip op. CA-5A 025 (Ariz. Ct.
App. Jan. 29, 1987) and Missouri v. Christensen, 720 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(same).
52. The court has spoken of classifications based on race or ethnic background as
suspect. Such classifications trigger heightened scrutiny. Yet, classifications which seem
to work to the benefit of minorities and to the disadvantage of whites have been givenspecial scrutiny. See infra note 135. Nevertheless, the Court continues to refer to minori-
ties but not whites as suspect classes. This is only logical since the Court has defined
suspect classes as those groups historically subject to ill-treatment and prejudice. See
infra note 134 and accompanying text. Minority groups but not whites meet such crite-ria. But, because the Court sometimes applies heightened scrutiny even when it is whites
who are disadvantaged, the relevance of the designation "suspect class" in equal protec-
tion cases is not entirely clear.
In gender cases, women, not men, clearly compose the group that historically has been
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a black defendant finds that the government intentionally has ex-
cluded all blacks from the jury venire or petit jury, that defendant
clearly can bring suit alleging a denial of the equal protection of law
guaranteed by the fourteenth and the fifth amendments. The basis of
such a claim seems to be that a defendant's right to trial by jury
includes the right to be tried by a jury composed of his peers and
equals, and that this right is violated when all members of his race
are excluded from his jury.53 The assumption is that defendants of
other races, particularly whites, have not been treated similarly and
therefore have not been disadvantaged by having members of their
race excluded from jury service.
If the defendant is not black or if the group excluded from jury
service is not blacks, it is far less clear whether the defendant can
bring an equal protection suit to challenge the composition of his
jury. A white defendant apparently has no standing, either in his
own right or on behalf of the excluded jurors, to bring an equal pro-
tection claim objecting to the exclusion of blacks from his jury. Yet
a prosecutor might wish to exclude blacks from a white defendant's
jury if, for example, the defendant were a civil rights activist or if
his chief alibi witness were black or if his attorney were black. 4 A
black defendant probably lacks standing to bring an equal protection
claim objecting to the exclusion of whites from his jury, as does a
male defendant to object to the exclusion of women.
No defendant, whether black or white, male or female, is likely to
prevail, even if standing requirements are met, in an equal protection
suit that objects to the exclusion of groups such as whites, poor peo-
ple, or blue-collar workers. Although these groups may constitute
substantial groups in the community, they have not been designated
suspect or semi-suspect classes for equal protection purposes. 55 De-
disadvantaged. Classifications which disadvantage men and benefit women, nevertheless,
are subject to heightened scrutiny. See infra note 137. The Court has indicated that this
is done because any classifications based on gender, even ones which seem to benefit
women, disadvantage women by perpetuating stereotypes about the abilities and needs of
men and women. Id. Classifications based on race which benefit minorities and are
designed explicitly to right past wrongs cannot be rationalized on this basis.
This Article does not attempt to reconcile the Court's statements on which groups
constitute "suspect classes" and which classifications trigger heightened scrutiny. When
the lower courts, in considering jury composition cases, speak of suspect classes, it is
blacks, Hispanics, women, and aliens, not whites and men, which they have in mind.
These courts use the term suspect classes to mean groups in need of protection. This
Article contends that the question of whether a group is one which needs protection is
different than the question of whether it is a group which should be represented on the
jury if the defendant is to have a fair and impartial jury.
53. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
54. See, e.g., State v. Maricopa County, slip op. CA-5A 025 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan.
29, 1987) (white defendant, represented by a black attorney, objected to the exclusion of
black veniremen).
55. See supra note 52.
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nying defendants the opportunity to pursue their claims under fair
cross-section analysis leaves many of them unprotected since the
equal protection analysis provides relief in only limited situations.
Shifts from Equal Protection Analysis to Fair Cross-Section
Analysis
Even though the Supreme Court has not decided the issue, several
state courts and lower federal courts nevertheless have held that the
fair cross-section requirement places limits on the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude certain groups from the petit jury. California
led the way in its 1978 decision, People v. Wheeler.56 State courts in
Massachusetts 57 New Mexico,58 Florida,59 New Jersey,60 and Dela-
ware, 1 as well as the Second and Sixth Circuits,62 have joined Cali-
fornia in turning to fair cross-section analysis rather than equal pro-
tection analysis to consider challenges to the composition of the petit
jury.63 Several Supreme Court Justices have indicated their willing-
56. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). Wheeler, who was
black, was convicted by an all-white jury of the murder of a white man. The court kept
no records on the race of the jurors but the defendant claimed that the prosecutor used
peremptory challenges to exclude all seven blacks in the venire. See id. at 263, 583 P.2d
at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. 893. The court noted the seeming inconsistency between Swain
and Taylor. See id. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. In finding for the
defendants, the court looked to CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 16, which states "Trial by jury is an
inviolate right and shall be secured to all . .. ."
57. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E. 2d 499 (1979) (court
relied on the MASS. CONsT., Declaration of Rights, art. 12, which guarantees a defendant
the right to a trial by jury of his peers).
58. See State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980) (court looked to the
state constitution to apply the fair cross-section requirement in the context of peremptory
challenges).
59. See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
60. See State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986) (court looked to
N.J. CoNsT. art. I, 5, 9 & 10 and applied a representative cross-section requirement).
61. See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339
(1986).
62. See Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986) and Batson v.
Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), aff'd, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 910 (1987); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. (1984), vacated and
remanded for further consideration in light of Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986)
and Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), reaft'd sub nom. Roman v. Abrams,
822 F.2d 214, 227 (2d Cir. 1987).
63. These courts have not encountered practical difficulties in scrutinizing in-
stances of allegedly improper use of peremptory challenges. The procedure suggested by
California in Wheeler has been followed explicitly or referred to by all of the other
states. The California court fashioned a procedure which places a manageable burden of
proof on the defendant while preserving the broad discretionary use of peremptory chal-
lenges for valid reasons. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.
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ness to consider limiting the use of peremptory challenges under
sixth amendment principles.64
Most of the courts that have applied the fair cross-section section
analysis to the petit jury indicated that they were doing so for two
reasons: (1) because a defendant's sixth amendment rights were be-
ing violated, and (2) because equal protection analysis, especially
when the systematic exclusion requirement of Swain was applied,
would not protect the defendant. 5 These courts generally have char-
acterized the prima facie test for equal protection analysis and the
primafacie test for fair cross-section analysis as virtually identical."6
In discussing the two analyses, many courts have noted only the
differing burdens of proof as the reason for shifting from equal pro-
Rptr. 890 (1978); infra note 70.
The California Supreme Court noted, five years after the Wheeler decision, that there
was no empirical evidence that the Wheeler procedures were unworkable. See People v.
Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983).
In McCray v. Abrams, the district court judge concluded that the Wheeler procedure
was a "sensible and useful model." 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd in
part and vacated in part, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Allen v. Hardy, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986) and Batson v.
Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). Justices Marshall and Brennan have referred to the
procedure as "quite workable." McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. at 969 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari and stating that the "California courts have [had] no
difficulty in applying [the Wheeler procedure]").
64. See Thompson v. United States, 469 U.S. 1024 (1984) (Brennan, J., joined
by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U.S. 981,
983 (1984) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissent-
ing from the denial of certiorari).
65. See, e.g., Soares, 377 Mass. at 479 n.17, 387 N.E.2d at 511 n.17. In Soares,
three black defendants were convicted of murder by a jury of eleven whites and one
black. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude 12 of 13 black potential
jurors. The court concluded that Swain offered only "illusory" protection and turned to
the state constitution to curb the abuse of peremptory challenges. Similarly, the Wheeler
court stated that "Swain obviously furnishes no protection whatever to the first defendant
who suffers such discrimination in any given court .... " Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 258,
583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
Swain has been subject to extensive criticism. For lengthy lists of commentators criti-
cizing the decision, see Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E. 2d 499
(1979); Note, Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory Challenge to Exclude Discrete
Groups From the Petit Jury: Commonwealth v. Soares, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.40
(1980); Comment, A New Standard For Peremptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32
STAN. L. REV. 189, 193 n.25 (1979). Many critics of Swain have emphasized the point
made by Justice Goldberg in his dissent that the majority placed excessive importance on
peremptory challenges by treating them as if they were a fundamental right. Justice
Goldberg claimed that the majority's holding meant that "[t]here is nothing in the Con-
stitution of the United States which requires the State to grant trial by an impartial jury
so long as the inviolability of the peremptory challenge is secured." Swain, 380 U.S. at
244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 3337 (1986); United States v. Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d 1380 (11th Cir. 1982);
Waller v. Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. 942 (M.D.N.C. 1984); United States v. Duran De
Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Abell, 552 F. Supp.
316 (D. Me. 1982).
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tection analysis to fair cross-section analysis when considering claims
that peremptory challenges were used impermissibly to exclude
groups from the petit jury.67 Most of these courts have made the
shift somewhat reluctantly. As a result, these courts have applied the
fair cross-section analysis with its lower burden of proof, but then
have limited the usefulness of the fair cross-section analysis in the
context of petit jury composition by retaining the equal protection
definitions of groups whose exclusion triggers scrutiny, and some-
times even its standing requirements.
In Batson,68 the Court greatly lowered the burden of proof re-
quired under an equal protection analysis.69 Nevertheless, the type of
proof required to rebut a prima facie case is not the only significant
difference between equal protection analysis and fair cross-section
analysis. Even after Batson it remains important to look to a sixth
amendment analysis, rather than an equal protection analysis, in
many jury composition cases. This is true because it is not only the
burdens of proof that differ but also the definitions of who has stand-
ing to assert a claim and which groups, when excluded, will trigger
review.
In Batson, because the group excluded was blacks and the defend-
ant was black, the Supreme Court was able to ignore these differ-
ences, use equal protection analysis, and avoid deciding whether fair
cross-section analysis applied. Blacks are a group entitled to special
consideration under equal protection analysis. Since the defendant
was black, and therefore a member of the excluded group, the case
did not involve a standing problem. The Court did not discuss those
cases in which equal protection analysis, even with the new, lower
burden of proof, would be inappropriate because the defendant
lacked standing to assert a claim. Nor did the Court discuss those
cases in which the excluded group, although part of the community,
was one, such as blue collar workers, which does not trigger height-
ened scrutiny under equal protection analysis. Under fair cross-sec-
tion analysis, a defendant need not be a member of the excluded
class in order to have standing to bring a claim. Furthermore, groups
exist that are not entitled to special consideration under equal pro-
tection analysis but are considered distinctive or cognizable for the
67. See supra notes 56-61.
68. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
69. In State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986), the court noted
that Batson had rejected the heavy burden of proof in Swain but nevertheless decided to
use a fair cross-section analysis to consider the defendant's jury composition claim.
1095
purposes of the fair cross-section requirement.
It remains important, therefore, that some state courts and some
lower federal courts are considering jury composition challenges
under a fair cross-section,70 rather than under an equal protection,
analysis. In discussing the two analyses, however, these courts have
focused on the difference in burdens of proof and have paid scant
attention to the differences in standing requirements and definitions
of group cognizability or distinctiveness. This has resulted partly be-
cause most of the cases, like Batson, met the standing and
cognizability requirements under either analysis because they in-
volved a black defendant objecting to the exclusion of blacks from
the jury. When examining the petit jury, many of these courts have
ignored the differences in standing and cognizability requirements
or, even worse, have indicated that the equal protection limits on
standing and cognizability should apply even in a sixth amendment
context.71
II. STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE EXCLUSION OF GROUPS FROM
THE JURY
Traditional standing analysis explains why a defendant clearly has
standing to object, under the sixth amendment, to the exclusion of a
group even if the defendant is not a member of the excluded group.
Two separate considerations must be addressed in determining
whether a party has standing to bring a claim. First, the party must
meet the constitutional case or controversy requirement by showing
that he has suffered an injury in fact. 2 A defendant is presumed to
suffer injury when certain groups are excluded from his jury because
the fair cross-section requirement is considered an essential compo-
nent of the sixth amendment 3 right to a fair and impartial jury. It is
not relevant whether the defendant was a member of the excluded
group. Apart from any injury suffered by potential jurors, the de-
70. Most of these courts have referred approvingly to the procedures outlined in
Wheeler. The California court in Wheeler found that a defendant first should:
make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must
establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within
the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the cir-
cumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are
being challenged because of their group association rather than any specific
bias.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. If the party is able to
raise an inference of abuse, the burden shifts to the other party to show that there were
reasons based on specific bias for challenging the potential jurors. If this burden is not
sustained, a new venire must be drawn and the jury selection process begun again. See
id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
71. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
72. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
73. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527.
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fendant is injured when any group is excluded and that exclusion
precludes the opportunity to select a jury that fairly represents the
community. If the jury does not fairly represent the community, the
defendant is denied a decision based on "diffused impartiality" 4 and
reflecting the community's "commonsense judgment."' 5 Second, as a
prudential matter, the party must show that he is the "proper propo-
nent of the particular legal rights" 71 on which the suit is based. In
addition, the interest sought to be protected must be within the zone
of interest meant to be protected by the particular statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question. The individual defendant's interest in
being tried by a jury representing a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity is a personal right and, thus, is within the zone of interest pro-
tected by the constitutional guarantee to an impartial jury.
In Taylor,7 the Supreme Court explicitly held that a defendant
need not be a member of the excluded group in order to object,-on
sixth amendment grounds, to the exclusion of a group from the jury
venire.7 8 Under this rule, white defendants have been able to chal-
lenge the exclusion of blacks,7 9 and male defendants have been able
to challenge the exclusion of women.80 If the fair cross-section prin-
ciple applies to the petit jury to limit the use of peremptory chal-
lenges, as well as to the jury venire, a defendant should have stand-
ing to object, under the sixth amendment, to the exclusion of any
74. Id. at 530.
75. Id.
76. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499 (1974); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
78. See id. at 526. Taylor, a male, claimed that the exclusion of women from his
jury deprived him of a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. The Court
explicitly reaffirmed this point in Duren, 439 U.S. at 359 n.l ("A criminal defendant
has standing to challenge exclusion resulting in a violation of the fair cross section re-
quirement, whether or not he is a member of the excluded class."). See also Thiel, 328
U.S. at, 225 (when a jury panel excluded blue-collar workers, the Court used its supervi-
sory power to reverse the judgment, stating that it was unnecessary to determine whether
the petitioner was a member of the excluded class). Cases applying Taylor to grant
standing include Clark, 737 F.2d at 682; United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 478
(7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d
1543 (11 th Cir. 1983) (the court assumed standing existed without discussing the issue);
Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184, 186 n.3 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 939
(1983); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1976); Musto, 540 F. Supp.
at, 351, afd sub nom., United States v. Amimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799,
806 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United States v. Marcano, 508 F. Supp. 462, 469 (D. P.R. 1980).
79. See, e.g., Clark, 737 F.2d at 681; Gometz, 730 F.2d at 478; Musto, 540 F.
Supp. at 351.
80. See, e.g., Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 351.
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cognizable group from the petit jury, regardless of whether the de-
fendant is a member of the group. Discomfort, however, with appli-
cation of the fair cross-section to limit peremptory challenges has led
at least one court to suggest that perhaps a defendant who is not a
member of the excluded group should not have standing to object to
the use of peremptory challenges.8
Standing requirements present a much greater problem for de-
fendants who seek to challenge the composition of the jury under
equal protection analysis rather than under sixth amendment fair
cross-section analysis. While persons excluded from jury service have
the right to bring an equal protection claim,82 the Supreme Court
has often stated that a defendant may bring an equal protection
claim only if he is a member of the group excluded from jury ser-
vice.83 The Court, however, has not been entirely consistent on the
question of whether a defendant has standing to bring an equal pro-
tection claim to challenge the exclusion of a group from the jury
when the defendant is not a member of the group.
In 1972 the Supreme Court heard a case in which a male defend-
ant challenged, on equal protection grounds, the exclusion of women
from his grand jury.84 Although the Court decided the case on other
grounds, it stated that nothing in the caselaw gives a man standing
to bring such a claim.8" Soon thereafter, the Court heard Peters v.
Kiff,86 the case which initiated much of the confusion in the lower
federal courts and state courts over standing in equal protection
cases. In Peters, the Court found that a white defendant had stand-
ing to challenge the exclusion of blacks from a state grand jury.87
The precise rationale for this finding, however, is unclear. The Court
began by stating that Peters' claim could not be brought under the
sixth amendment because the sixth amendment had not yet been ap-
plied to the states when his trial took place.88 The Court specifically
noted that if Peters had been able to proceed under the sixth amend-
ment he clearly would have had standing to challenge the exclusion
of any group.89 After turning to "the commands of equal protection
and of due process," 90 the Court pointed out that it had "never
81. See Schreiber v. Salamack, 619 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("can
a white defendant object to the challenging of black jurors?").
82. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
83. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S.
545 (1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); see also Batson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1716 n.3 (collecting cases).
84. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
85. See Id. at 633.
86. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
87. See Id. at 504.
88. See Id. at 496.
89. See Id. at 500.
90. Id. at 496.
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before considered a white defendant's challenge to the exclusion of
Negroes from jury service," 91 and had not passed on the "same
class" rule imposed by most courts.92 The Court found it unneces-
sary to consider Peters' claim that his equal protection rights had
been violated,93 concluding that Peters was denied due process of law
because he was subject to indictment by an illegally composed jury.94
Some lower courts have recognized Peters as a due process case and,
therefore, not authority for finding that a defendant has standing to
challenge, under equal protection, the exclusion of a group of which
he is not a member. 95 Other courts have improperly characterized
Peters as an equal protection case and used it as support for finding
standing in an equal protection context even when the defendant is
not a member of the excluded group.96
Statements in cases after Peters indicate that the Supreme Court
assumes a defendant may not bring an equal protection claim unless
he is a member of the excluded group. In Castaneda v. Partida,97 a
Mexican defendant challenged the exclusion of Mexicans from the
jury. The Court, quoting from an earlier case, said that a defendant
was denied equal protection of the laws when "all persons of his race
or color"98 were excluded from the grand jury. The Court went on to
say that the first step in establishing an equal protection violation is
to show a "substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the iden-
tifiable group to which he belongs."99 Two years later, in another
equal protection case, Rose v. Mitchell,100 the Court specifically
quoted this statement from Castaneda, which refers to the group to
which the defendant belongs.' 0' However, at two other places in the




92. Id. at 496-97 n.4.
93. See id. at 497 n.5.
94. See id. at 501, 504.
95. See Cronn, 717 F.2d at 167; Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 353.
96. See Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d at 1385-86 (the court claimed that the Peters
Court discussed the question of standing "in an equal protection context"); United States
v. Donohue, 574 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D. Md. 1983).
97. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
98. Id. at 492 (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954)).
99. Id. at 494.
100. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
101. See id. at 565. Some courts have referred to Rose's reference to Castaneda to
deny standing. See United States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 946, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
United States v. Cross, 516 F. Supp. 700, 706 (M.D. Ga. 1981).
102. Rose, 443 U.S. at 556.
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The Supreme Court somewhat clarified its position on standing in
its 1984 opinion in Hobby v. United States.1 0 3 The Court considered
the due process claim of a white male defendant objecting to the
exclusion of women and blacks from the position of grand jury
foreperson. Except for a footnote stating that in Peters a white male
was allowed to assert a due process claim objecting to racial discrim-
ination in the jury composition, the Court included no substantial
discussion of standing. 04 The Court's view, however, is evident in its
discussion of why Hobby could not look to the earlier Rose case to
support his claim. The Court noted that Rose involved an equal pro-
tection claim in which the defendants, as blacks, were "members of
the class allegedly excluded from service as grand jury foremen."'10
In Batson, the Court once again spoke only of protecting a defendant
from the exclusion of members of his race from the jury.10 6 The
Court went on to say that peremptory challenges could not be used
to exclude black jurors in a case against a black defendant0 7 and
that to make a prima facie case the defendant had to show that he
was a member of the cognizable racial group being treated
differently.108
Even before Hobby, few lower courts had found that a defendant
had standing to challenge, under equal protection, the exclusion of a
group to which he did not belong.' 09 Most courts found that Peters
was an aberrational case which permitted standing in due process
cases but not in equal protection cases. 1 0 Although the language in
recent decisions indicates that the Court assumes a defendant must
be a member of the excluded class, such language arguably is dic-
tum because it appears in cases in which the defendant was a mem-
ber of the excluded group."' Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court
has not stated specifically that a defendant can bring an equal pro-
103. 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
104. Id. at 343-44 n.2.
105. Id. at 347.
106. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1716.
107. See id. at 1719.
108. See id. at 1723.
109. See, e.g., Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587, 606 (11th Cir.) (white male
defendant had standing to challenge, under equal protection, the exclusion of blacks and
women), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984); Perez-Hernandez, 672 F.2d at 1386 (The
court noted the troubling language in Partida and Rose but found Peters applicable even
in an equal protection case.); Donohue, 574 F. Supp. at 1278; Abell, 552 F. Supp. at
320; United States v. Holman, 510 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Cronn, 717 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1983): United
States v. Coletta, 682 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1202 (1983);
Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 353; Beal v. Rose, 532 F. Supp. 306, 309-10 (M.D. Tenn. 1981),
vacated without op., 703 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Tennessee v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903
(Tenn. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); see also Cross, 516 F. Supp. at 706
(looked to Partida to find no standing).
S11. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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tection claim only if he is a member of the excluded group, this
seems to be the premise on which the Court proceeds.
Although the Supreme Court assumes that a defendant must be-
long to the excluded group in order to bring an equal protection
claim, the basis for the assumption is unclear. It is difficult to deter-
mine the standing requirements for an equal protection objection to
the composition of the jury because the interest protected by such an
objection is not clearly defined.
Over one hundred years ago, the Court enunciated, and continues
to affirm, the proposition that a black defendant is denied equal pro-
tection if he is tried by a jury from which blacks purposefully have
been excluded.' 12 The Supreme Court has articulated two chief evils
resulting from such discrimination. The first is that excluded jurors
are branded with a stamp of inferiority. 1 3 When blacks are excluded
from jury service and whites are not, the blacks excluded are denied
equal protection of the law. These potential jurors are entitled to
bring their own equal protection claim to object to their exclusion
from participation as jurors." 4 If the defendant is given standing so
that this evil can be prevented, he is given third party standing; that
is, standing to assert the legal rights of the excluded jurors. Al-
though it will be shown shortly that third party standing is not ap-
propriate in jury composition cases, it is worth noting that a white
defendant would seem to be equally capable of acting as a third
party to protect the fifth or fourteenth amendment rights of black
potential jurors as would a black defendant.
The second evil resulting from the discriminatory selection of ju-
ries is the personal injury done to a defendant who is denied the
right to a jury composed "of his neighbors, fellows, associates, per-
sons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds.""' 5 It is to vindicate this right that a criminal defendant has
dire t standing to bring an equal protection claim. Since Batson, a
black defendant need show only the exclusion of blacks from his own
jury."0 But the basis of such an equal protection claim is that a
black defendant has been denied a jury including members of his
race, while whites presumably are being tried by juries made up of
members of their race. Although the notion that a defendant is in-
112. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
113. See id. at 308.
114. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
115. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
116. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1722.
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jured when members of his race are excluded from the jury is not
always accurate, it is well-accepted by the Court and explains why
the same class rule applies in the equal protection context.
If the defendant's standing to assert his claim is based on third
party standing, then a same class rule is not necessary in equal pro-
tection cases. Therefore, before concluding that the same class rule
for standing presents an insurmountable obstacle to the equal protec-
tion claims of some defendants, we must consider why jus tertii or
third party standing is not appropriate in jury composition cases.17
In general, a defendant has standing to raise only his own rights.118
Some courts, however, have found third party standing to challenge
jury composition because equal protection upholds not only the
rights of the individual defendants, but also the interests of the po-
tential jurors and the more general interest in maintaining the integ-
rity of the judicial system." 9
Granting standing so that a defendant can vindicate society's in-
terest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system puts the
defendant in the position of a private attorney general. If third party
standing were granted on this basis, the defendant would not need to
be a member of the excluded group. Any defendant tried by a jury
from which some groups had been purposefully excluded could serve
in the role of private attorney general. Characterizing the interest in
maintaining the integrity of the judicial system as one protected by
equal protection would remove any real requirements for standing.
This interest is diminished when any constitutional guarantee is vio-
lated in a judicial setting. It can be protected adequately if the de-
fendant brings his claim under the constitutional provision specifi-
cally designed to protect his rights by requiring trial by an impartial
jury.
Third party standing should not be granted to allow a defendant
to uphold the rights of potential jurors not to be excluded from jury
service. Third party standing generally is permitted to uphold the
rights of other individuals for three reasons: 120 1) the existence of a
substantial relationship between the claimant and the third par-
ties;12' 2) the impossibility of the third parties vindicating their own
117. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114; Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 353. For an excellent
general discussion on third party standing, which has been relied on in this section of the
article, see Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984).
118. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Beal, 532 F. Supp. at 309
("Traditionally, standing has been accorded only members of the allegedly ill-treated
group when an attack is mounted upon equal protection grounds."); Monaghan, supra
note 117, at 286.
119. See Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 320.
120. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
121. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
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rights;'22 and 3) the likelihood that the rights of third parties would
be diluted or adversely affected if the suit were not permitted. 123
These three reasons do not apply to a defendant objecting to the
exclusion of potential jurors.
First, no special relationship exists, such as that of a physician and
patient, 2 4 between a defendant and the potential jurors who were in
the excluded group. Second, those persons in the excluded group can
protect themselves because they have the right to bring their own
equal protection action. 125 Potential jurors do not face nonlegal ob-
stacles, such as a desire or need to preserve their anonymity, in
bringing such a suit.1 26 Finally, third party standing to assert an
equal protection claim simply is not applicable in the context of a
defendant objecting to the exclusion of a group from the jury. 27 The
right of potential jurors to participate in jury service will not be di-
luted if the defendant is not entitled to object to the exclusion. The
Court has found such a situation to exist when a buyer of an item,
such as a house, 28 or alcohol, 29 or contraceptives, 30 is being dis-
criminated against, but it is the seller of the item who has brought
suit. 31 No similar nexus or relationship exists between a defendant
and potential jurors. Third party standing has been limited to situa-
tions in which the litigant's interaction with the rightholder is neces-
sary to the third party's exercise of his right.
To deny a defendant standing under equal protection to challenge
the exclusion of a group to which he does not belong is in accord
with unquestioned Supreme Court caselaw over the last hundred
years. On the other hand, a defendant has standing under the sixth
amendment to challenge the exclusion of a group, whether or not he
belongs to that group. This contrast highlights the need to permit
sixth amendment fair cross-section challenges to object to jury com-
122. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114-16; Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446; NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 353.
123. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445-
46; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257.
124. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
125. See Carter, 396 U.S. at 329.
126. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (members of the organization
wished to remain anonymous).
127. See Cronn, 717 F.2d at 170; Coletta, 682 F.2d at 823; Musto, 540 F. Supp.
at 353.
128. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (the purchaser sought to use the
discriminatory ordinance as a defense).
129. See Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
130. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
131. See Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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position. Lowering the burden of proof in jury composition cases
brought under equal protection, as the Supreme Court recently did
in Batson, does not help those defendants who are not members of
the excluded group and who, therefore, do not have standing under
equal protection regardless of the level of proof required to prevail.
III. DEFINING COGNIZABLE GROUPS
In Lockhart v. McCree,132 the Supreme Court stated that cogniza-
ble groups should be defined by reference to the purposes of the fair
cross-section requirement. The lower federal courts and state courts
have not always realized this and little agreement exists on which
groups are cognizable. This section's survey of the caselaw defining
groups for sixth amendment and for equal protection purposes,
should make it clear that suspect classes are only a subset of cogni-
zable groups and do not set the boundaries for cognizability.
There are more groups whose exclusion may constitute a violation
of the fair cross-section requirement than there are groups whose
exclusion triggers heightened scrutiny under equal protection. Even
if a defendant meets the standing requirements for an equal protec-
tion claim, he has little hope of prevailing if the group excluded was
other than one of the few suspect classes, such as blacks, that gener-
ally are viewed as triggering heightened scrutiny under equal protec-
tion analysis. That is, while a white defendant might be granted
third party standing to object to the exclusion of blacks, no reason
exists to grant a black defendant standing to object to the exclusion
of whites, or a woman standing to object to the exclusion of men.
Under equal protection analysis, a classification presumptively is
invidious and therefore subject to heightened scrutiny if it disadvan-
tages a suspect class. 133 In designating groups as suspect, the Su-
preme Court has looked to whether the classification reflects deep-
seated prejudice rather than the pursuit of a legitimate objective.
The Court has inquifed whether the group historically has been
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extaordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process. 1 34 Classifications based on race135 or
132. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
133. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
134. Id. at 217 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 28 (1973)); see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
135. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Blacks and other racial minorities historically subject
to prejudice have been considered the suspect groups triggering strict scrutiny. However,
some members of the Court, although not characterizing whites as a suspect class, have
maintained that any racial classification triggers strict scrutiny even if it is whites who
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national origin' are inherently suspect while classifications based
on sex,137 alienage, 1a8 and illegitimacy 139 are subject to an intermedi-
ate standard of scrutiny, 40 and can be considered semi-suspect.
While equal protection groups are defined by reference to past
mistreatment and discrimination, groups cognizable for sixth amend-
ment purposes are those whose presence is required to reflect a fair
cross-section of the community. The Supreme Court has never speci-
fied how to define cognizable groups for sixth amendment purposes.
The Court explicitly has recognized as cognizable only groups de-
fined by race, ethnic background, or sex. The Court's decisions, how-
ever, do suggest that although the exact boundaries of cognizability
are not yet settled, they encompass more groups than the few suspect
classes. An early Supreme Court case indicated that the exclusion of
"economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups
are disadvantaged. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1846 (1986)
(judgment of the Court by Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., and by
O'Connor, J. in part). No consensus yet exists among the Justices concerning the level of
equal protection scrutiny to be applied in affirmative action cases. See id. at 1862" (opin-
ion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J. and Blackmun, J.). Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun have stated that since whites have none of the immutable char-
acteristics of a suspect class, actions involving them should not trigger strict scrutiny. See
University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.,
White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.). See also Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1869 n.10
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (The court has applied strict scrutiny when a disadvantaged class
has been subjected to a tradition of prejudice).
136. See Partida, 430 U.S. at 495 (Mexican-Americans); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954).
137. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Women, not men, historically have
been disadvantaged. Nevertheless, classifications by gender trigger strict scrutiny even if
they seem to disadvantage men and benefit women. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982). This is so not because men are a suspect class, see
Michael v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981) (men do not
need any special consideration because of past discrimination or disadvantages), but be-
cause any statute with gender classifications may reflect "archaic and stereotypic no-
tions" about men and women. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 279, 283 (1979). Such statutes may be based on "the mechanical application of
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women."
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726; see also City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432, 441 (1985) ("Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes dis-
tributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect out-
moded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.").
138. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
139. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978).
140. See Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 901-02 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1017 (1982). See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (sex); Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (ethnic
background).
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of the community"141  is impermissible. The federal statutory
equivalent of the fair cross-section requirement refers to groups de-
fined by race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic sta-
tus. 142 Recently, the Court admitted that it had never defined the
term "distinctive" or "cognizable" group. While it once again de-
clined to do so, the Court did decide that "groups defined solely in
terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair
members of the group from performing one of their duties as jurors
...are not 'distinctive groups' for fair cross-section purposes." 3
Nor does a consensus definition on cognizability exist among the
state courts and lower federal courts. Whether a group is cognizable
depends on the time and location of the trial. 4 Most courts, how-
ever, have identified common criteria which are completely different
than those used to determine whether a classification should trigger
a high level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis. The factor
most often mentioned is whether there is some internal cohesion, co-
hesive attitude, or common perspective resulting from life experi-
ence. 1 45 Most courts also have required that the group have some
quality that defines and limits it. The group also should be a sub-
stantial one numerically in the community.
146
Some courts have added the requirement that the group's interest
or perspective cannot be represented adequately by other persons in
the community.1 47 This requirement was discussed at great length by
a lower state court in California,14 8 which found that while resident
141. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (daily wage earners could not be excluded from the
jury).
142. See The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1862.
143. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1766 ("Witherspoon - excludables," those prospective
jurors who state that they would not, under any circumstances, vote to impose the death
penalty, are not a cognizable group).
144. See Zant, 720 F.2d at 1216 (cognizability depends on the time and location
of the trial); see also United States v. Daly, 573 F. Supp. 788, 790 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 988 (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1272 (1986); Zant, 720 F.2d at 1216; United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901,
904 (9th Cir. 1977); Test, 550 F.2d at 591; United States v. Marrapese, 610 F. Supp.
991, 1003 (D.R.I. 1985); Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 322; Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.
3d 93, 97-98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737 (1979); Adams v. Superior
Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 60, 1524 P.2d 375, 378, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (1974).
146. See, e.g., Zant, 720 F.2d at 1216; Potter, 552 F.2d at 903; Test, 550 F.2d at
591; Marrapese, 610 F. Supp. at 1003; Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 322; see also United
States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.) (a group must have a definite composi-
tion and its membership cannot shift from day to day), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
147. See, e.g., Zant, 720 F.2d at 1216; Potter, 552 F.2d at 903; Test, 550 F.2d at
591; Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 322; Guzman, 337 F. Supp. at 143-44; Rubio, 24 Cal. 3d at
103, 593 P.2d at 601, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
148. See Rubio v. People, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 595, 154 Cal. Rptr 734 (1979).
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aliens and ex-felons had special perspectives, their views could be
represented adequately by other members of society who had had
experiences similar to those of the persons in the excluded groups.
For example, naturalized citizens once were aliens, and some
soldiers, like ex-felons, once were imprisoned. 14 9 Under this reason-
ing almost no group would be cognizable. Businessmen once may
have been daily wage earners but the former would be a poor repre-
sentative for the latter. If those once confined to a mental institution,
as the California court suggested, adequately can represent the per-
spectives of ex-felons, then why could not blacks, a minority group,
represent Hispanics, another minority group?
A few courts also have looked to whether the group has been sub-
jected to prejudice or discrimination, 150 and to whether exclusion
would create bias against the defendant or stigmatization of the
group. 15  These considerations for defining cognizable groups, of
course, are the ones most like those used to define suspect or semi-
suspect classes for equal protection.
All courts have agreed that women 152 and blacks 153 are cognizable
groups. Other groups which have been found cognizable include
Mexicans,154 Spanish surnamed persons,1 55 and Latins in Miami. 56
Courts differ on whether Native Americans, 57 blue collar work-
149. See id. at 100, 593 P.2d at 599-600, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
150. See, e.g., Potter, 552 F.2d at 904-05.
151. See, e.g., Marrapese, 610 F. Supp. at 991.
152. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); see also Bowen, 769 F.2d at 684; Marrapese, 610 F. Supp. at 1004; Dono-
hue, 574 F. Supp. at 1276; Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 325; Musto, 540 F. Supp. at 354;
United States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799, 804 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
153. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879); see also United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 962 (1984); Butkovich, 593 F. Supp. at 949; Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at
807.
154. See Test, 550 F.2d at 586; Duran De Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. at 1328.
155. See People v. Trevino, 39 Cal. 3d 667, 704 P.2d 719, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1985).
156. See Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at 804 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
157. Compare Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982) (Native
Americans constitute a cognizable group.); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982) and State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D.
401, 184 N.W.2d 654, 656 (1971) (Indians are cognizable) with United States v. Han-
son, 472 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (D. Minn. 1979) (Indians are not cognizable for sixth
amendment purposes).
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ers, 158 whites, 159 the less educated, 6 ' those not proficient in Eng-
lish,""' and Hispanics 6 2 constitute cognizable groups. Groups gener-
ally not found to be cognizable include those in low socioeconomic
groups, 63 those in classifications based on age, 64 the unemployed, 6 5
resident aliens, 66 ex-felons, 6 7 union members,6 " and nonvoters. 69
The greatest reluctance to define cognizability for the purposes of
the fair cross-section requirement has been demonstrated by those
courts applying the requirement to the petit jury to limit the use of
peremptory challenges. In shifting from equal protection analysis to
fair cross-section analysis in order to address jury composition
claims, some courts have limited application of the fair cross-section
158. Compare Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earn-
ers are a cognizable group) and Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 324 (blue collar workers in some
communities may constitute a cognizable group) with Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp.
at 804 (blue collar workers do not constitute a cognizable group) and United States v.
Marcano, 508 F. Supp. 462, 469 (D. P.R. 1980) (working class is not a cognizable
group).
159. Compare Roman v. Abrams, 608 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (whites are a
cognizable group), rev'd, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987) with Schreiber v. Salamack, 619
F. Supp. 1433 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (whites are not a cognizable group), affd sub nom.,
Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987).
160. Compare United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (Ist Cir. 1970) ("less
educated" may constitute a cognizable group) and Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 324 (the less
educated may constitute a cognizable group in some communities) with Cabrera-
Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at 804 (persons with less than a high school education do not
constitute a cognizable group) and Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 469 (the less educated do
not constitute a cognizable group).
161. Compare United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982) (assumed that persons not proficient in English constitute
a cognizable group) and United States v. Marrapese, 610 F. Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 1985)
(citing Benmuhar) with Test, 550 F.2d at 594 (persons not proficient in English do not
constitute a cognizable group).
162. Compare United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425, 429 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (Cuban-Americans in Florida are not a cognizable group) and
Duran De Amesquita, 582 F. Supp. at 1328 (cannot lump together persons of Nicara-
guan, Salvadoran, Puerto Rican, Mexican, Spanish, and Cuban heritage) with United
States v. Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Latins in Miami are
cognizable).
163. See Marcano, 508 F. Supp. at 469. But see Abell, 552 F. Supp. at 324 (in
some communities some economic groups may be cognizable groups); United States v.
Andrews, 342 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (D. Mass. 1972) (exclusion of "paupers" from voting
lists violated Jury Selection Act), rev'd on other grounds, 462 F.2d 914 (1972).
164. See, e.g., Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1271 (1986); Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036, 1038 (11th Cir.
1983); Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141, 146 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975
(1982); Potter, 552 F.2d at 905; Test, 550 F.2d at 591; Guzman, 468 F.2d at 1247.
165. See United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977); Mar-
cano, 508 F. Supp. at 469.
166. See United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1984); Rubio v. People, 24
Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 594, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
167. See Rubio v. People, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 593 P.2d 594, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1979).
168. See United States v. Gibson, 480 F. Supp. 339, 343 n.7 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
169. See Camp v. United States, 413 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 396
U.S. 968 (1969); United States v. Kroncke, 321 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Minn. 1970).
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requirement to the petit jury and to claims involving equal protection
groups rather than the more broadly defined cognizable groups.
They have done so despite the fact that in the context of applying
the fair cross-section requirement to the jury venire, more groups
have been found cognizable than the few groups specially protected
under equal protection.
The California Supreme Court, the first court to use fair cross-
section analysis to limit peremptory challenges, did not define cogni-
zable groups in Wheeler because blacks, the group being considered,
clearly were a cognizable group.170 At one point the court referred to
representation by groups "defined by race, religion, ethnic or na-
tional origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition,
place of residence, and political affiliation, ' 1 7' but at another point
the court referred simply to "racial, religious, ethnic or similar
groups."'1 2 A lower court in California later claimed that Wheeler
meant to define cognizable groups only as those delineated by race,
sex, ethnicity, or religion.
73
Many of the courts which have accepted the Wheeler fair cross-
section approach have taken a narrow view of cognizability correlat-
ing roughly to the suspect classes of equal protection analysis. When
Massachusetts adopted the reasoning of Wheeler, it limited the re-
view procedure to groups defined by race, sex, color, creed, or na-
tional origin. 174 The court obtained this definition of cognizable
groups from the equal rights amendment of the state constitution. 7 5
Delaware adopted the Wheeler procedures in a case involving the
exclusion of blacks and did not discuss what constitutes a cognizable
group. 17 New Mexico applied the Wheeler approach in a case in-
volving the exclusion of blacks but specifically left open the question
of whether the procedure would be applied to other groups. 77
New Jersey also has adopted the Wheeler procedures. The New
Jersey Supreme Court stated that groups based on religious princi-
ples, race, color, ancestry, national origin, and sex - the suspect and
semi-suspect classifications - are the "core cognizable groups.' 178
170. See 22 Cal. 3d at 280 n.26, 583 P.2d at 764 n.26, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.26.
171. Id. at 266, 583 P.2d at 755, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
172. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
173. See People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 95, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731, 743
(1979).
174. See Soares, 377 Mass. at 488-89, 387 N.E.2d at 516.
175. See MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. I.
176. See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985).
177. See Crespin, 94 N.M. at 489, 612 P.2d at 718.
178. Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 526 n.3, 511 A.2d at 1159 n.3.
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The court refused to determine which other groups are cognizable
but noted that courts are divided over whether groups defined by
age, economic status, or occupation could be cognizable. The court
found it unnecessary to determine whether groups such as the handi-
capped or veterans, which are given special protection under New
Jersey law, might be cognizable groups in some contexts.1 79
The federal courts have taken divergent views on cognizability. In
applying the fair cross-section requirement to limit peremptory chal-
lenges, the Second Circuit found that blacks and Hispanics consti-
tuted cognizable groups but offered no further definition. 180 Two dis-
trict courts in the Second Circuit then came to opposite conclusions
on whether whites constitute a cognizable group. 181 The Sixth Cir-
cuit spoke more Broadly, finding that both blacks and whites are cog-
nizable groups'8 2 and referring to distinctive groups as those defined
by skin color, gender, nationality or similar characteristics."8 3
The courts have been most likely to view cognizability for fair
cross-section purposes too narrowly in cases involving peremptory
challenges. But even when applying the fair cross-section require-
ment to the jury venire, some courts have come close to finding that
exactly the same groups are cognizable for both sixth amendment
and equal protection purposes. For example, in finding that blue col-
lar workers are not cognizable for fair cross-section purposes, the
First Circuit looked only to equal protection cases for a definition of
cognizable groups. Instead of discussing the defendant's need to have
such a group represented in the jury venire, the court spoke at length
about defining distinct groups as those that require the aid of the
courts to avoid discrimination and prejudice."" The court com-
plained that thousands of groups could be found cognizable. While it
is difficult to find a bright-line test for defining cognizable groups,
tests from equal protection analysis have only ease of application to
commend them and unnecessarily limit the fair cross-section
analysis.
Nearly all of the courts that have applied the fair cross-section
requirement to the petit jury to limit the use of peremptory chal-
lenges have done so in cases involving the exclusion of blacks. Be-
cause blacks indisputably constitute both a cognizable group and a
suspect class, the courts were not required to define cognizability or
to differentiate between cognizable groups and suspect classes. But
the courts, mostly in dictum, have used language suggesting that
179. See id.
180. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1135.
181. See supra note 158.
182. See Booker, 775 F.2d at 773.
183. See id. at 771.
184. See Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986).
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cognizable groups may be nearly equivalent to the few groups that
trigger heightened scrutiny under equal protection. Cognizable
groups can be defined properly only by referring to the constitutional
guarantee in question, the sixth amendment right to a fair and im-
partial jury. An examination of the rationale of this constitutional
right demonstrates the impropriety of limiting the applicability of
the fair cross-section requirement by resorting to definitions bor-
rowed from equal protection analysis when defining cognizable
groups.
IV. PURPOSES OF THE FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT
The primary goal of the constitutional guarantee to equal protec-
tion of law is to protect groups from invidious discrimination.!85 For
example, blacks excluded from jury service are being treated differ-
ently from whites who are permitted to serve. Although excluded ju-
rors clearly have the right to bring equal protection suits, 186 defend-
ants are much more likely to want to challenge the composition of a
jury. A defendant who finds that all potential jurors in his racial or
ethnic group have been excluded may bring an equal protection
claim. 87 The basis of his claim would be that he, unlike other de-
fendants, is being tried by a jury not composed of his peers and
equals. Equal protection is concerned with ensuring that all groups
are treated similarly, as either jurors or defendants.
The primary goal of the fair cross-section requirement is to pro-
vide the individual defendant with a fair and impartial jury as re-
quired by the sixth amendment. The Supreme Court has found that
the fair cross-section requirement helps achieve the purpose of the
jury, which is to "guard against the exercise of arbitrary power"'88,
by making "available the commonsense judgment of the commu-
nity." 8 9 The Court has explained how the fair cross-section require-
ment accomplishes this purpose. Representation of many groups on
the jury assures a "diffused impartiality"' 90 by not excluding from
the jury room the various "qualities of human nature and varieties of
185. See Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correction Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d
1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978) ("The central purpose of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is of course the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race."); Cabrera-Sarmiento, 533 F. Supp. at 808.
186. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
187. See Partida, 430 U.S. at 492.




human experience." 191 Likewise, the primary goal of the Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act of 1986 (Jury Selection Act), 192 the statutory
equivalent of the fair cross-section requirement, is to ensure that fed-
eral juries are selected from a fair cross-section of the community.
19 3
The second purpose of the fair cross-section requirement is to per-
mit all members of the community to share in the administration of
justice as a "phase of civic responsibility."19 4 This gives recognition
"to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found in
every stratum of society."'91 5 Excluding persons from jury service be-
cause they belong to a particular group "open[s] the door to class
distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the demo-
cratic ideals of trial by jury,"196 and makes the jury an "instrument
of the economically and socially privileged."' 9 Excluding a group
"stigmatizes the whole class, even those who do not wish to partici-
pate . . ,198
A third and final rationale for imposing the fair cross-section re-
quirement is that it maintains public confidence in the integrity of
the judicial system. If groups can be excluded arbitrarily from juries,
the legitimacy of the jury system is undermined. In enacting the
statutory equivalent of the fair cross-section requirement, the Jury
Selection Act, Congress stated that its aim was to assure that poten-
tial jurors are selected from a cross-section of the community and to
provide all qualified citizens the opportunity to be considered for
jury service.' 99
Clearly, an overlap in the goals achieved by application of the fair
cross-section requirement and equal protection analysis exists in the
context of jury selection. Both requirements help maintain the gen-
eral integrity of the judicial system. Both requirements help avoid
discrimination against groups whose members are prevented from
undertaking jury service. But while stopping discrimination directed
at groups is the primary goal of applying equal protection analysis, it
is only a secondary goal in applying the fair cross-section require-
ment. The primary rationale for the fair cross-section requirement is
not that it protects members of groups but that it protects any indi-
191. Id.
192. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1862.
193. See United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 191 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 921 (1980).
194. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531 (quoting Thiel, 328 U.S. at 227 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
195. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 224.
198. Peters, 407 U.S. at 499.
199. See H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG . & ADMIN. NEWS 1792, 1792; See also United States v. Torquato, 308 F. Supp.
288, 290 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
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vidual defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. The sixth
amendment is concerned primarily with the rights of the defendant,
not with the rights of those in the group excluded from jury
service.200
The differing burdens of proof under equal protection analysis and
fair cross-section analysis reflect the different purposes of the two
analyses. A defendant bringing an equal protection claim must show
intentional discrimination.2 01 But a defendant bringing a claim under
the sixth amendment need not show bad faith.20 2 Furthermore, a
prima facie showing that groups have been excluded from the venire
cannot be rebutted simply by showing a lack of discriminatory in-
tent. At the petit jury level, the defendant must show that peremp-
tory challenges were used to exclude jurors not because of their spe-
cific bias in a case but simply because they belonged to a particular
group.
2 0 3
Recognizing that the rights of the defendant and the rights of po-
tential jurors are separate and distinct is crucial to understanding
why groups cognizable for sixth amendment purposes and groups
which trigger heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis
need not correlate. Discrimination against potential jurors is pre-
vented by granting heightened scrutiny under equal protection to
those few groups which historically have been subject to unfair treat-
ment. To fully vindicate a defendant's fair cross-section right, we
must find cognizable all groups that are distinct in the community
and have numerous members. 0 Suspect classes are chosen with an
eye to history and past ill-treatment; cognizable groups are chosen
by determining whether their members possess a perspective that
must be represented on the jury if the jury is to be fair and impar-
tial. There is no necessary correlation between cognizable groups de-
fined in this way and groups that in any way are disadvantaged or
even particularly cohesive. A defendant, whether he is black or
white, has as much right to object to the exclusion of all whites from
the jury' as to object to the exclusion of all blacks. Whites, while
probably not a suspect or even a semi-suspect class, surely are a cog-
nizable group.
The courts which have used sixth amendment cross-section analy-
200. See Hanson, 472 F. Supp. at 1053.
201. See Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1721.
202. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1131-32.
203. See id. at 1131.
204. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
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sis but limited its application to cases involving the exclusion of
equal protection groups generally have done so without explanation
or reference to the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement or
equal protection analysis. This mixing of sixth amendment analysis
and equal protection analysis probably is due to the fact that early
claims of unfair jury selection procedures were grounded only in
equal protection. 20 5 Although the Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that the fair cross-section requirement is an essential compo-
nent of the right to a representative jury, the Court did not hold that
the sixth amendment applies to the states until 1968.208 Further-
more, because the burden of proof for objecting to peremptory chal-
lenges under equal protection, until recently, was extremely difficult
to meet, courts seem reluctant to apply fully the less stringent sixth
amendment analysis in the peremptory challenge context.
Courts may be limiting application of the fair cross-section re-
quirement because they are more concerned with those goals of the
cross-section requirement that overlap with the goals of equal protec-
tion analysis. They are losing sight of the fact that the chief goal of
the fair cross-section requirement remains the protection of every de-
fendant, not the protection of only particular groups. In Lockhart,
the Supreme Court recently made it marginally more difficult to dis-
tinguish between the goals of the fair cross-section requirement and
equal protection. Although the Court declined the opportunity to de-
fine group distinctiveness or cognizability for fair cross-section pur-
poses, the Court stated that the concept had to be linked to the pur-
poses of the cross-section requirement. The Court then went on to
refer to Taylor and list these purposes as:
(1) "guard[ing] against the exercise of arbitrary power" and ensuring that
the "commonsense judgment of the community" will act as "a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor," (2) preserving "public con-
fidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system," and (3) implementing
our belief that "sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility."207
Although this list is accurate, the Court hardly discussed the de-
fendant's individual right. The Court refers to protection against
"arbitrary power" but not to the "diffused impartiality" ensured by
a representative jury.
The standing requirements and the definition of a cognizable
group differ for fair cross-section analysis and equal protection anal-
ysis because the two analyses vindicate different rights and reflect
separate goals and policies. The caselaw on standing requirements
and the definition of cognizability under each analysis often does not
205. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
206. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
207. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31).
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reflect these differences. Examining the differing rationales of equal
protection and the fair cross-section requirement shows the need to
distinguish clearly the two means of challenging jury composition.
The present confusion in the area of jury composition claims is a
result of the mixing of equal protection and sixth amendment
analysis.
In holding in Lockhart that jurors who state that they would never
vote for the death penalty do not constitute a cognizable group for
sixth amendment purposes, the Court referred several times to equal
protection groups to give examples of which groups are recognized as
cognizable. The Court further blurred the lines between equal pro-
tection groups and cognizable groups by stating that cognizable
groups had "some immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or
ethnic background"208 and often were "historically disadvantaged
groups."209 If such statements are interpreted by courts as expressing
an exclusive definition of cognizable groups, the important distinc-
tion between cognizable groups and groups significant for equal pro-
tection purposes will be lost.
CONCLUSION
The fair cross-section requirement has been recognized as an es-
sential component of the sixth amendment right to a fair and impar-
tial jury. A defendant's right to a jury that fairly represents the com-
munity is wholly distinct from the right of persons to serve as jurors.
Limiting fair cross-section analysis with equal protection require-
ments prevents defendants from vindicating their own sixth amend-
ment rights unless their claims also will further equal protection
goals. There is no reason for leaving some defendants unprotected in
this way. Defendants are deprived of their sixth amendment rights
when a group is excluded from the jury regardless of whether the
defendants are members of the excluded group. They should not be
subject to the "same class" rule, which is appropriate in equal pro-
tection cases, in order to meet standing requirements. A white or
hispanic defendant should have the same right as a black defendant
to object to the exclusion of blacks from the jury. Likewise, defend-
ants are deprived of their sixth amendment rights when any cogniza-
ble group, not just the few suspect classes, are excluded from service
on the jury. The exclusion of senior citizens, whites, men, or blue-
208. Id. at 1766.
209. Id.
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collar workers is as much a violation of a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights as is the exclusion of a suspect class such as blacks.
Courts have noted that the different burdens of proof for equal
protection claims and fair cross-section claims require the use of the
latter analysis to vindicate fully sixth amendment rights. But courts
must recognize that sixth amendment rights will remain unvindi-
cated if fair cross-section claims are rejected because equal protec-
tion standing requirements or definitions of a group are not met.
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